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ABSTRACT
Since the 1980s the number of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organiza-
tions has increased in most western countries. This article offers a theoretical
explanation for politicians’ apparent preference for quangos. The model is
based on rational choice sociology, neo-institutional economics and public
choice. Hypotheses are formulated on the conditions that are expected to
influence politicians’ choice. The statistical analysis, using a database of 124
decisions to establish 392 quangos in The Netherlands between 1950 and
1993, shows that quango proliferation is more a trend than a well-informed
choice. This raises new questions for research.
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Introduction
In many western states from the 1980s on administrative reforms have trans-
formed the way in which governments are organized and operate. Privatiza-
tion, competitive tendering and giving agencies freedom to manage are all
examples of such reforms (see, among others, Osborne and Gaebler, 1992;
Hood, 1994; Kettl, 1997; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). This article will
focus on the proliferation of so-called quangos; quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organizations (Barker, 1982). In short, quangos carry out
public tasks but operate at arm’s length of the government. Their number
increased strongly during the 1980s and 1990s.
After discussing the quango concept in more depth, I will go into the
motives of politicians for using quangos to carry out public tasks. This article
will present and test an explanation that is based on rational choice sociol-
ogy, neo-institutional economics and public choice. A model is developed
to predict under which conditions politicians will choose quangos for
policy implementation rather than government bureaucracy. Hypotheses
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are formulated and tested statistically.1 The results will show that quango
proliferation is more a trend than a deliberate choice. This raises new ques-
tions for research.
Definition of a Quango
Quangos are organizations which, as their main task, are charged with the
implementation of one or more public policies and which are funded publicly
but operate at arm’s length of the central government, without an immediate
hierarchical relationship existing with a minister or a parent department.
A more precise definition is hard to find. As a consequence, different
researchers and practitioners list different types of organizations as quangos.
For example, in the United Kingdom the estimated number of quangos
ranges between more than 6000 (Hall and Weir, 1996) and just over 300
(Hogwood, 1995).
To find a useful solution to this definition problem, it is necessary to
acknowledge that there is not just one type of quango. Instead, there are
several types of organizations that could be classified as quangos. Following
this idea, Table 1 presents a subsectional map of quasi-autonomous organ-
izations (taken from Greve et al., 1999).
Table 1 shows four types of organizations: (1) contract agencies (see the
British Next Steps agencies), (2) public bodies (e.g. non-departmental
public bodies, para- or extra-governmental organizations and the Dutch
ZBOs [short for zelfstandige bestuursorganen]), (3) voluntary or charity
organizations and (4) state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Examples are given
for each type of quango, from three countries: the United Kingdom,
Denmark and The Netherlands. All empirical references in this article will
be to quangos of the ‘public body’ type, for reasons explained later.
The typology of quasi-autonomous organizations is based on the assump-
tion that the conditions under which an organization operates determine
what type it is. Table 1 lists three conditions: (1) financial arrangements,
(2) the extent to which ministerial accountability applies and (3) the control
mechanisms for ministers. The type of task is not included as a distinctive
condition, because different types of quangos can be charged with similar
tasks. Going through the table from right to left, one will notice the turning
point in the middle, where opportunities for politicians to exert influence
(control mechanisms, ministerial accountability and finances) decrease and
the autonomy of quangos increases. Autonomy is defined as the ownership
of the rights of production, i.e. who decides about or provides the organiza-
176 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 16(2)
1. This article presents the summarized version of a larger argument. See Van Thiel (2001) for
more elaboration and for a study of quango performance.
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Table 1. Subsectional map of quangos (taken from Greve et al., 1999)
Privatization/ semi
privatization
Voluntary/charity Public body Contract agency
Definition Former state-owned
company now wholly or
partly privatized
Bottom-up body
performing public
function
At arm’s length but
publicly funded
Quasi-autonomous part of
department
Finances Capital market, stock
exchange
Donations, subsidy State budget or levying State budget
Ministerial responsibility No No Partial Yes
Control mechanism Market regulation Co-op, contract Statutes Framework document
Public task Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public domain No Yes Yes Yes
UK British Rail Shelter Regulators, TECs Prison Service
The Netherlands Postal Services Salvation Army Police authorities,
Legal aid
Meteorological Office
Denmark Copenhagen Airport Danish Sport Association National bank Patent Office
tion with goals, tasks, budget, input variables such as labor and capital,
output and/or outcome, prices of supplied goods or services and the produc-
tion process.
Quangos are quasi-autonomous, which means that they are given some of
the production rights but not all. Part of the production rights remains the
prerogative of the minister of the parent department. There is no uniform
arrangement in this matter, as every single quango, irrespective of its type,
owns a different set of production rights. In general, most quangos receive
relative managerial freedom: managing the production process (input,
output and procedures) is their own responsibility. The minister is no longer
accountable for managerial affairs. The minister does remain accountable for
policy matters, the choice of a quango and supervision of quangos. A limited
ministerial responsibility is accompanied by fewer control mechanisms for
ministers (Stone, 1995). Due to the mixed ownership of production rights,
quangos are not public organizations in the traditional sense, as, for example,
departmental units, although they do belong to the public domain.
It would be a mistake to assume that quangos are entirely new organiza-
tions. In most western countries, they have a longstanding tradition. For
example, the Dutch ZBOs are a type of public body that has been in use
for decades or even centuries (Leeuw and Van Thiel, 1999). The same goes
for non-departmental bodies in the United Kingdom, Crown entities in
New Zealand, VOIs in Flanders, and state-owned enterprises in Sweden,
Finland and Denmark (Hood and Schuppert, 1988; Modeen and Rosas,
1988; Flinders and Smith, 1999; Greve, 1999; Wistrich, 1999). However,
the number of quangos has increased rapidly from the 1980s on. See, for
example, Figure 1 which displays the increase in the number of ZBOs in
TheNetherlands. Based on inventoriesmade in 1993 (AlgemeneRekenkamer,
1995) and 2000 (Van Thiel and Van Buuren, 2001), Figure 1 shows in which
years ZBOs were established. A strong increase in the 1980s and 1990s is
clearly visible.
A comparison over time shows that ZBOs are seldom abolished (3 percent
in 1980s and 6 percent in 1990s) but they are often merged and re-organized
(about one out of five cases) or subject to re-definitions (Van Thiel and Van
Buuren, 2001). Ergo, the position of an organization on the quango conti-
nuum need not be constant over time. Quango drift can occur; for example,
an agency can become a public body or a privatized organization can be re-
nationalized.
Politicians’ Motives for Choosing Quangos: Practitioner Theory
Politicians mention different motives for their choice of quangos, that is
if they mention any. There seems to be a general lack of justification by
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politicians for the use of quangos (except in New Zealand; see Boston, 1995).
When they do mention a motive, politicians usually expect an increase in the
efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation, they hope to bring the
government closer to the citizens by putting policy implementation at arm’s
length or by leaving matters to social groups (self-regulation) or they want to
leave policy implementation to independent experts. The sum of these expec-
tations will be referred to in this article as being the ‘practitioner theory’ of
quangos. Other motives are ascribed to politicians as well, such as the use
of quangos to circumvent other levels of government (e.g. municipalities)
or patronage i.e. rewarding political friends by appointing them as quango
board members.
Theoretical Model: Premises
Rather than using practitioner theory, this article proposes another expla-
nation of politicians’ choice for quangos. It builds on rational choice
sociology (Lindenberg, 1983, based on work by Adam Smith; Coleman,
1990) combined with elements from neo-institutional economic approaches
(Williamson, 1989; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1991) and public choice (Mueller,
1989, 1997; Dunleavy, 1991, 1994, based on work originated by Downs, 1965
and Niskanen, 1975). This combination is possible because all theories
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Figure 1. Rate of Establishment of ZBOs in The Netherlands, 1900–2000
(Source: Van Thiel, 2001)
mentioned are based on a rational actor model of man. To ascertain the
causes of quango proliferation, it is necessary to determine under which con-
ditions politicians choose quangos as executive agent, rather than govern-
ment bureaucracy.
Two premises are fundamental to the proposed explanation of quango
proliferation. The first premise is that macro phenomena can be explained
by using certain assumptions about the behavior of individuals and the con-
ditions or constraints under which they act (methodological individualism).
In the problem situation at hand, two actors will be distinguished, both of
whom should be considered as key actors: (1) the legislature and (2) the
executive agent. The behavior of these corporate actors is the aggregated
behavior of individuals. On the basis of certain assumptions about the
behavior of individuals, the macro behavior of the two corporate actors will
be predicted or explained (Coleman, 1990: 541).2 Of course, this is a strong
simplification, which does not do justice to the empirical complexity of the
problem. Moreover, in reality, other actors, such as interest groups and
civil servants, will play an important role in the process of quango prolifera-
tion as well. I will return to this point later on.
The second premise is that the behavior of individuals is rational, that is
they pursue goals. By achieving goals in the most efficient way, actors can
maximize their expected utility. According to the social production function
approach – based on work originated by Adam Smith – the two universal
goals for all individuals are physical well-being and social approval (see,
for example, Lindenberg and Frey, 1993). These universal goals are reached
by way of intermediary, or instrumental, goals. The achievement of goals is
restricted by the amount and type of resources an actor has at his disposal
and the constraints he faces. By determining their intermediary goals and
constraints, the behavior of (corporate) actors can be modeled and testable
hypotheses formulated. Such a constraint-driven approach offers a simplified
way of modeling individuals’ behavior. By introducing the concept of uncer-
tainty, some of these simplifications will be relaxed during the development
of the theoretical model later.
It is important to keep in mind that the model presented here is but a first
step in the explanation of quango proliferation. The last section of this article
provides a number of recommendations for further elaboration of the model
and future research.
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2. This approach is supported by Scharpf, who – concerning the application of methodo-
logical individualism to political processes – said that ‘[i]n the politicial process . . . the most rele-
vant actors are typically acting in the interest, and from the perspective, of larger units, rather
than for themselves. This allows us to simplify analysis by treating a limited number of large
units as composite (i.e., aggregate, collective, or corporate) actors with relatively cohesive
action orientations . . .’ (1997: 12).
The Choice of Legislature for an Executive Agent
The corporate actor ‘legislature’ comprises all elected politicians. As agents
acting on behalf of the citizens, politicians will aim their behavior at fulfilling
the goals of voters, who are their principals. However, politicians have their
own goals as well. Following public choice theory, a politician’s physical
well-being and social approval is dependent on his being re-elected (see,
e.g., Downs, 1965; Mueller, 1989; Dunleavy, 1991). If he is not re-elected,
a politician cannot continue his job and obtain the benefits that enable
him to maximize physical well-being and social approval. Being a politician
allows one (1) to acquire the wealth and/or power associated with being a
politician; (2) to propagate and implement ideologies, beliefs or opinions;
and (3) to attain (more) electoral support.
To gain and keep the support of voters necessary for re-election, politi-
cians will adopt policies favorable to the electorate. For the implementation
of those policies, they have to choose an executive agent. Here, politicians are
given the choice between only two types of agents: government bureaucracy
or a quango. Their choice will be determined by the extent to which it can
contribute to the maximization of the number of supportive votes.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Choosing Quangos
Choosing a quango as an executive agent implies the transfer of (some of) the
production rights, which means a reduction in the responsibility of politi-
cians for policy implementation. Limited responsibility reduces political
risks, such as loss of electoral support, because politicians can no longer be
held accountable for bad policy implementation (see Cohn, 1997).3 However,
it becomes difficult for politicians to benefit from successful policy implemen-
tation, it no longer being ascribed to them directly. Politicians can, however,
claim to have made the right choice.
Limited responsibility does not imply any responsibility at all. Some
responsibility remains, for example, for the choice for a quango, the budgets
given to quangos and the supervision or regulation of quangos.
Besides limiting responsibility, the transfer of production rights is advan-
tageous to politicians in another way. The fact that a bureaucracy does not
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3. Often politicians remain responsible ‘by reputation’. Even though policy implementation
has been hived off and is formally no longer the responsibility of politicians, a failing quango
is still considered a public affair, both by voters and the media. This has already led to some
‘scandals’, where politicians were held accountable or even forced to resign because of the
poor performance of a quango (e.g. the prison service [a Next Steps agency] in the UK and
the regulator of social security [Ctsv, a ZBO] in The Netherlands).
own any production rights is inherent to it being designed to be impartial
or neutral. Quangos, however, can be used by politicians to enhance the
commitment of (new) supportive (groups of) voters. For example, interest
groups can be charged with policy implementation and, thus, become a
quango (‘hiving in’) or they can be appointed members of a quango board.
This type of patronage is not possible within most western Weberian bureau-
cracies. By increasing the participation of (groups of) voters in the implemen-
tation of policies, their commitment – and, hence, their electoral support – to
politicians will increase.
Based on these suppositions, it would seem logical to expect politicians at
all times to prefer quangos as executive agent, as opposed to government
bureaucracy. Or, as Gazendam and Homburg (1999) put it, the choice for
quangos is the most politicially efficient choice. However, politicians have
to take the economic aspects of policy implementation (efficiency and effec-
tiveness) into account as well.
Efficient and effective implementation of policies offers politicians the
opportunity to either implement more policies from the same budget or
reduce taxes. Both options will be appreciated strongly by voters and
increase electoral support. However, there does not seem to be an a priori
reason to assume that either bureaucracy or a quango is always the most
economically (in-)efficient executive agent. Both have characteristics that
induce and impede efficiency or effectiveness.
Bureaucracy has the benefits of longstanding experience with policy imple-
mentation and, as a result, a longstanding relationship with politicians. The
need to invest in monitoring is, therefore, usually considered to be low.
The large scale of the governmental bureaucracy allows the efficient use
and/or redeployment of particular assets (knowledge, equipment) but makes
innovation often more difficult and expensive because of high internal co-
ordination costs.
Quangos, in contrast, are usually established to implement just one parti-
cular policy. Knowledge and technologies are not redeployed for other use,
which reduces efficiency. The main potential efficiency gains of quangos lie in
the reduction of coordination costs. Putting policy implementation at arm’s
length means that politicians no longer have to deal with all the details of
daily operational activities. However, monitoring costs increase because
politicians still need information to meet the demands of their (now limited)
political responsibility.
To sum up, choosing a quango as an executive agent can lead to a gain
in electoral support due to the benefits of patronage and limited respons-
ibility. If, however, the choice made leads to inefficient and ineffective
policy implementation, the resulting loss of votes may exceed the benefits.
Politicians will have to weigh the potential gains of their choice against the
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losses. The situational constraints under which they make their decision may
vary, leading to different choices.
Conditions Affecting Politicians’ Choice for Quangos
There is a large number of possible situational constraints that could influ-
ence politicians’ choice. In the following, eight conditions are described and
explained. The rationale for choosing these conditions is also presented.
Political Ideology
Of course, ideology plays a major role in the process of policy design and
policy adoption. Its role in decisions on the type of executive agent is
assumed to be much less important though. The benefits of reduced mini-
sterial responsibility and patronage will appeal to all politicians, irrespective
of their ideological preferences. Other conditions or situational constraints,
such as the type of task and policy sector concerned, are expected to exert
much more influence. The following hypothesis is formulated:
HYPOTHESIS 1: Politicians with different political ideologies do not differ in
their choice for quangos as an executive agent, as opposed to government
bureaucracy.
Economic Conditions
Following practitioner theory, politicians can be expected to prefer quangos
in times of economic downswing, because the anticipated efficiency gains can
relieve fiscal stress. However, the opposite may also be true: in times of eco-
nomic upswing, one could expect more quangos. Economic upswing can lead
to an expansion of government tasks. More policies need to be implemented
and the probability that quangos are charged with these tasks increases.
So, economic conditions are not expected to be decisive to politicians’
choice: they may, however, lead to different ways of establishing quangos.
In times of economic downswing, quangos are more likely to be created by
hiving off parts of, for example, a ministry, whereas, in times of upswing,
private organizations are hived into the public sector and turned into
quangos. All in all, however, politicians’ choice of quangos is not expected
to be influenced by economic conditions:
HYPOTHESIS 2: Differences in economic conditions will not influence the
choice of politicians for quangos as an executive agent, as opposed to govern-
ment bureaucracy.
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So, neither political ideology nor economic conditions are – contrary to
common sense – expected to be decisive with respect to the choice of politi-
cians for quangos. What then are the conditions that do influence this
choice? Politicians are expected to choose the executive agent that maximizes
the opportunities to increase electoral support. Therefore, the higher the
potential increase in electoral support is, the more politicians will be inclined
to prefer quangos to government bureaucracy. In the following, two condi-
tions are discussed that can increase electoral support: electoral competition
and corporatism.
Electoral Competition
When the competition for votes is strong among politicians, they need to
ensure their electoral support and will search for opportunities to boost
the number of supportive voters. Competition is fierce in election years or
when the differences in electoral support for politicians (or parties) are
small. In such situations, to increase support and improve one’s bargaining
power in the cooperative efforts necessary for the adoption of policies and
the decisions on policy implementation, politicians will use every means to
increase electoral support. Quangos not only offer the opportunity to
increase the commitment of (groups of) voters through patronage, they
also reduce potential political risks, because the responsibility of politicians
for policy implementation becomes limited. Both mechanisms could lead to
an increase in electoral support. This brings us to the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3: The stronger the electoral competition among politicians is,
the more often will they choose quangos to government bureaucracy for
the implementation of policies.
Corporatism
Participation of interest groups is expected to increase electoral support
because of the patronage effect discussed before. In situations with many
interest groups, the potential gain of votes is larger than in situations
where there are only a few interest groups – unless these are large groups,
of course. Therefore, I expect more quangos to be established in policy
sectors with many interest groups (corporatist sectors) than in fields with
fewer interest groups:
HYPOTHESIS 4: In corporatist policy sectors, politicians will more often choose
quangos, rather than government bureaucracy, as an executive agent, than in
non-corporatist policy sectors.
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So far I have discussed conditions under which it is beneficial for politi-
cians to choose quangos as executive agents, because it induces the oppor-
tunity to gain votes. However, there are also cases where the choice for
quangos can diminish electoral support. The benefits of patronage and
limited responsibility are then reduced strongly, or exceeded by the costs
of inefficiency. Two such conditions are discussed next: collective goods
and specific investments.
Collective Goods
Voters expect the government to provide collective goods. Therefore, I
expect politicians to prefer government bureaucracy to quangos as executive
agents when collective goods are concerned. The potential benefits of limited
responsibility for quangos (i.e. lower political risks) are outweighed by the
loss of opportunities to claim successful policy implementation concerning
goods. Moreover, politicians want to be able to exert direct control and inter-
vene at will, not only to prevent ill performance and reduce political risks but
also to guarantee re-election by demonstrating to the voters how well their
interests are being served. The opportunities for direct control and inter-
vention are better in a government bureaucracy. When dealing with quangos,
they are limited and often more expensive (because of extra monitoring
costs). Therefore, my contention is that the greater the extent to which a
good or service that has to be provided bears the characteristics of a collec-
tive good – i.e. non-exclusiveness and jointness of supply – the less likely it is
that politicians will charge quangos with its provision:
HYPOTHESIS 5: The more policy implementation resembles the provision of
collective goods, the less likely it is that politicians will choose quangos as
executive agent, rather than government bureaucracy.
Specific Investments
Policy implementation requires investments in knowledge, equipment, tech-
nology and other assets. The more task-specific these investments are, the
harder it is to redeploy them to alternative use, without loss of productive
value, and the higher the risk of inefficiency becomes (Williamson, 1989:
142). The large-scale implementation of policy by government bureaucracy
necessitates the presence of a large number of assets at all times, which
makes redeployment easier and enhances efficiency and effectiveness.
Take, for example, the fact that policy implementation often requires legal
knowledge. In a ministry, a legal unit that advises all other units can be estab-
lished (redeployment of knowledge). A quango would have to consult a legal
specialist on matters concerning the policy that has to be implemented but
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can consult that specialist only on that policy (i.e. it is a non-recurrent invest-
ment).4 Policy implementation by government bureaucracy will, therefore,
be more efficient and effective. Following the ideas of transaction cost
analysis (Williamson, 1989: 150–1), I would, in the case when specific invest-
ments are necessary, expect politicians to prefer government bureaucracy
(see vertical integration) to quangos (see market) when it comes to choosing
an executive agent.
Specific assets may also create a (semi-)monopoly for agents. Sunk costs
make it very expensive for dissatisfied politicians to choose another agent.5
Politicians might even become dependent on such an agent, particularly
because most agents have a legal monopoly on policy implementation.
White (1991) refers to this as reversal of control. A dependent principal
might be forced to accept a certain level of inefficiency or ineffectiveness.
Or, inefficiency or ineffectiveness go unnoticed, because there are no com-
petitors with which to compare the agent’s performance.
Reversal of control can occur with all agents, either government bureau-
cracies or quangos. However, as specific investments are made less often in
a bureaucracy, because resources or assets are already available and can be
more easily redeployed, the risks of choosing bureaucracy as an executive
agent will appear lower to politicians. Moreover, because politicians own
all production rights of the bureaucracy, they can exert immediate control
over its activities, which is not the case with quangos. In quangos, the oppor-
tunities for control are limited and the distance between politicians and agent
is greater. Hence, politicians will prefer government bureaucracy to quangos,
when specific investments are involved (see Ter Bogt, 1994: 215):
HYPOTHESIS 6: The more specific the investments required for policy imple-
mentation are, the less likely it is that politicians will choose a quango as
the executive agent.
Until now I have implicitly assumed that politicians are capable of making
a well-considered choice or, in other words, that they are fully informed
about all the costs and benefits that a particular choice would bring. How-
ever, this does not seem a truly realistic assumption. The amount of informa-
tion actors can assess and comprehend is limited. Herbert Simon labeled this
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4. Of course, quangos could share specific assets. However, the costs of negotiating the invest-
ment and use of assets would still lead to higher average costs than investments made by a
government bureaucracy.
5. It can also be argued that expensive specific investments and/or low usage frequency of
assets could be a reason for politicians to hive them off or privatize policy implementation. How-
ever, such high and very specific transaction costs raise the problem of finding investors (or
shareholders) willing to invest (see Hazeu, 2000: 77–9).
‘bounded rationality’ (1976: 40–1; see also Williamson, 1989: 138–9). Here,
bounded rationality means that politicians cannot be entirely certain
whether, under the circumstances, their choice for a certain executive agent
is indeed the best – the most efficient and effective – and will enable them
to maximize physical well-being and social approval.
To reduce uncertainty, individuals will seek information (Rogers, 1995;
Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 347). Politicians can use several strategies
when gathering information. The first is imitation, which means that politi-
cians ex ante use information on efficient and effective agents. The second
strategy is monitoring, which provides ex post information on the efficiency
and effectiveness of policy implementation. Monitoring can also be used to
give voters an account of the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implemen-
tation. Both strategies will thus increase the possibilities for politicians to
make the ‘best’ choice, gain electoral support and secure re-election. Gather-
ing information requires investment of time and money, however, and
increases the costs of policy implementation. Therefore politicians will try
to use cost-saving strategies.
Imitation
Imitation is a simple and cheap method of using information, gathered by
other people. Politicians can, for example, copy the choice of other politi-
cians for a certain type of agent (see, e.g., Pollitt et al., 2001 on contract
agencies). For example, politicians will look for examples of the use of
quangos in other countries, regions, levels of government and/or policy
sectors. If quangos are perceived to be efficient and effective, politicians
will copy the choice for that type of agent,6 which will result in an increase
in the number of (that type of) quangos. To further maximize the benefits
of imitation, politicians can copy the choice for a certain type of agent
straightforwardly, choosing an agent with similar characteristics, tasks and
operating in similar policy fields. The phenomenon where, in different sectors
of society, policy sectors or countries, more and more similar organizations
are established is called isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 151).
A second type of imitation concerns the acquisition of information by
gradually building up experience with particular types of agents, through
either experimentation or the repetition of choices. By gradually increasing
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6. By implication, if the choice for a quango as an executive agent is not perceived as success-
ful, politicians will not repeat that choice. This need not always be the case, however. As was
argued before, the political responsibility for policy implementation by quangos is limited.
Therefore, politicians can repeat their choice for a quango even if its performance is not regarded
successful, because it is not the politicians who are held accountable for ill performance but the
quango.
their experience, politicians will accumulate information that will reduce
their uncertainty. When having been evaluated as a successful choice,
quangos will be chosen more often as an agent. Moreover, they will be
used in an increasingly diversified way:
HYPOTHESIS 7: The more information about and experience with quangos
politicians acquire, the more often will they choose quangos rather than
government bureaucracy as executive agents: quangos will be used for a
greater variety of tasks and set up in an increasing number of policy sectors.
Monitoring
Monitoring provides politicians ex post with information on the perfor-
mance of agents. They can use this information to evaluate whether their
choice of agent was successful and should be repeated (imitation). Moreover,
politicians can use the information to show voters in what a good way
policies are implemented, and thus secure electoral support. However, there
are two problematic aspects to monitoring. First, it requires investment
(so-called monitoring costs; Arrow in Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1991) which
will increase the costs of policy implementation and create possible ineffi-
ciencies. To avoid inefficiencies, politicians will try to minimize monitoring
costs. Monitoring costs are expected to be lower for government bureau-
cracies than for quangos.
The opportunities to intervene in the activities of quangos are limited.
However, politicians can use alternative monitoring devices for quangos
that do not require additional investments. For example, the participation
by interest groups (i.e. patronage) can be viewed as a way of making quangos
more accountable to the demands of citizens. Monitoring is, thus, replaced
by ‘accountability to the market’, which is expected to ensure efficiency
and reduce the need for monitoring by politicians (see Waldegrave, 1993;
Stone, 1995).
A second problem is that monitoring devices – such as compulsory publi-
cation of annual reports and annual accounts – have to be imposed at the
time an agent is charged with policy implementation (hence ex ante), because
accountability requirements have to be laid down in the agent’s statutes. The
wish to minimize monitoring costs can induce politicians to impose no
requirements until these prove necessary (Leeuw, 1995). In other words,
politicians decide to trust the executive agent until it is found ‘guilty’ of
inefficiency. To sum up, monitoring can be used to gather information on
agents and reduce the uncertainty of politicians regarding the effects of
their choice. At the same time, politicians want to minimize monitoring
costs. This observation leads to the following hypothesis:
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HYPOTHESIS 8: When policy implementation requires large investments in
monitoring, politicians will less often choose quangos as an executive
agent, rather than government bureaucracies.
Table 2 summarizes these hypotheses and their expected effects. Now, we
turn to the testing of these hypotheses.
Research Design: Data Sources, Operationalizations
and Methods
Most research into quangos is case study based. There are hardly any data-
bases available on large numbers of quangos. For this study I have used a
database collected by the Dutch Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer,
1995) on Dutch ZBOs (henceforth referred to as the NCA survey).
Additional data were collected from a number of secondary sources, includ-
ing the Dutch State Directory and The Netherlands Bureau of Statistics
(CBS). See Table 2 for an overview of all sources.
The availability of the NCA survey is unique but, as with all secondary
sources, also not without problems. Most problematic is the one-sidedness
of the information. There is no information on the choice of politicians for
government bureaucracy as an executive agent, only information on the
number of decisions to establish ZBOs. Therefore, it has to be assumed
that within the population of choices of an executive agent, choosing govern-
ment bureaucracy is the same as not choosing a quango. This implies, how-
ever, that conclusions based on this study relate to conditions that induce
quango proliferation and not to conditions that discourage the choice of
government bureaucracy as an executive agent.
The dependent variable is the number of decisions to establish a quango
per year or the number of quangos established per year (because one decision
can lead to more than one quango). A decision is measured as the passing of
the law by which a ZBO is established. Between 1950 and 1993, the number
of decisions per year ranges from 0 to 10, leading to maximum 28 quangos
being established in one year (all outliers censored at 28). Note that the
number of cases in the analysis equals the number of years (N ¼ 44).
To measure the independent variables per year, some aggregations had to
be made of the characteristics of individual decisions per year, by means of a
weighting formula. For example, corporatism in a particular year is the sum
of the degree of corporatism in those policy sectors where quangos were
established, weighted according to the number of established quangos in
those sectors. A similar approach was used for collective goods and specific
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Table 2. Overview of hypotheses, operationalizations and data sources
Hypothesis Operationalization independent variable Effect Source
1 Political ideology Left-wing cabinet (dummy) 0, n.s. Kiezer en Parlement (1950–93)
2 Economic success Percentage economic growth þ CBS (1998)
3 Electoral competition Election year (dummy) þ CBS (1998)
4 Corporatism Number of acknowledged advisory boards in policy
sector
þ Staatsalmanak (1993)
5 Collective goods Collectiveness of policy sectors (1, 2 or 3)  Algemene Rekenkamer (1995)
6 Specific investments Specificity of tasks (1, 2 or 3)  Algemene Rekenkamer (1995)
7 Imitation 1. Number of decisions in previous year
2. Time * corporatism
3. Time * collective goods
4. Time * specific investments
1. þ
2. 
3. þ
4. þ
1–4, Algemene Rekenkamer (1995)
2, Staatsalmanak (1995)
8 Monitoring Accountability scale score (0–1)  Algemene Rekenkamer (1995)
Control variables:
1. Size of policy sector
2. Size of government
1. Number of divisions at parent department
2. Number of civil servants
1, Carasso et al. (1994)
2, Van der Meer and Roborgh (1993)
0, no effect; þ, positive effect; , negative effect; , mixed prediction; n.s., not statistically significant
investments.7 Moreover, a time-lag was applied to most variables because it
takes time to develop and pass a law to establish a quango. Analyses were
performed with a time-lag of one year and four years. Here, only the results
for a one-year time-lag are reported.
Linear regression is considered an appropriate method of analysis. Inspec-
tion of the data reveals two problems, however. First, auto-correlation was
found in the dataset; i.e. the number of decisions to establish quangos
in year t is influenced by the number of decisions in year t 1 (Berry and
Feldman, 1985: 76). The introduction of time-related explanatory variables
in the regression analysis (e.g. time, imitation variables) is expected to
solve this problem.8 Second, the dependent variable is a count variable.
As counts are always positive integers and have a high variance, their distri-
bution is not normal and the application of (ordinary) linear regression
inappropriate (Long, 1997). Instead, a method of analysis should be used
which is based on a Poisson distribution. A Poisson regression analysis
was used to analyze the number of decisions to establish quangos. Because
of the presence of over-dispersion, the analysis of the number of established
quangos was done by means of a Negative Binomial Regression Analysis
(NBRA, see Long, 1997: 230–49).9
Results of the Analyses
Based on the theoretical model, three models are tested. First, the base model
consists of three control variables: time, size of government and size of policy
sector. This model is used to make sure that the analyzed increase in the
number of quangos is more than just an autonomous trend. Second, the
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7. For ‘collective goods’ and ‘specific investments’ weights were appointed to particular
policy sectors and tasks of quangos respectively. For example, Foreign Affairs and Finances
were considered high on collective goods, while Agriculture and Traffic were considered low
on collective goods. And supervision and quasi-judicature were considered very specific tasks,
whereas coordination and research were seen as not very specific. The analyses were carried
out with several weights but results did not vary. In the analyses presented here, the following
weights were used: 3 (high), 2 (moderate) and 1 (low).
8. A regression analysis confirmed the presence of autocorrelation (Durbin Watson coeffi-
cient DW ¼ 1:40). The introduction of the additional explanatory variables t and Yt 1 solved
this problem (DW ¼ 1:98; DW ¼ 2 means no autocorrelation).
9. Over-dispersion means that the variance of the dependent variable exceeds its mean (see
Barron, 1992: 179–90; Agresti, 1996: 92; Land et al., 1996: 388). For over-dispersion, Poisson
regression analysis leads to overestimation of statistical significance. NBRA is a more ‘skeptical’
method than Poisson regression (Gardner et al., 1995: 399–402) and gives a better fit because it
is more flexible (see Land et al., 1996: 392–4). NBRA tests for the presence of over-dispersion,
indicated by alpha.
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Table 3. Results of Poisson Regression Analysis of the Number of Decisions per Year to Establish Quangos, The Netherlands, 1950–93
(N ¼ 43, Time-lag 1 Year)
Explanatory variables Coefficients (z-value)
Base model Rational actor model Bounded rationality model
Time .03 (1.25) .06a (2.05) .03 (.89)
Size of government 4.41b (2.59) 5.76b (2.94) 2.95 (1.31)
Size of policy sector 6.32 (1.77) 7.08 (1.89) 7.06 (1.83)
Left-wing cabinet .36 (1.73) .31 (1.40)
Economic growth .03 (1.14) .04 (1.08)
Elections .77b (2.94) 1.24c (3.98)
Corporatism .07 (.22) .02 (.06)
Collectiveness  .16 (.63) .08 (.30)
Specific investments .14 (.46) .02 (.06)
Previous decisions  .14b (2.70)
Time * corporatism .03 (1.04)
Time * collectiveness .02 (.82)
Time * specificity .02 (.48)
Monitoring 1.16a (2.44)
Constant 9.21 (.93) 13.75 (1.29) 1.58 (.13)
Log-likelihood 84.08 77.07 67.95
Pseudo R2  .15 .22  .31
a p < :05; b p < :01; c p < :001.
rational actor model that, besides the control variables, also includes the con-
ditions specified in Hypotheses 1–6. This model is called the rational actor
model because it assumes politicians to be rational actors. This assumption
is released in the third model, the bounded rationality model. Imitation and
monitoring are added as explanatory variables to the rational actor model.
Tables 3 and 4 show the results.
Base Model
Quango proliferation is partly an autonomous trend. The increase in the
number of quangos is related to the increase in the government size. Appar-
ently, bureaucratization and quango proliferation go hand in hand, contrary
to what is often suggested by practitioner theory.
Rational Actor Model
Political ideology has no (statistically significant) influence on the number of
decisions to establish quangos. Hypothesis 1 is thus confirmed. Economic
conditions do not appear to be decisive to politicians’ choice either. Hypo-
thesis 2 can, therefore, be considered to be confirmed as well.
Hypothesis 3 is refuted: contrary to the expectation, competition for votes
between politicians leads to fewer decisions to establish quangos. Elections
lead to fewer decisions to establish quangos. Perhaps politicians are less
interested in policy implementation during elections, giving priority to the
development of new ideas and policies to please voters. Politicians consider
the choice of an executive agent as less salient to voters.
Neither the degree of corporatism nor the degree of ‘collectiveness’ in
policy sectors is found to be of importance to politicians’ decisions. Hypo-
theses 4 and 5 are, therefore, neither confirmed nor refuted.
Politicians do not decide to charge quangos with tasks that require specific
investments more often but if they do the executive agent is usually a cluster
of quangos. Most Dutch ZBOs (74.5 percent) belong to a cluster, although
only 13.7 percent of the decisions result in the establishment of a cluster.
The conclusion is that quangos are charged more often with specific tasks.
Hypothesis 6 is rejected.
An explanation for this finding can perhaps be found in the typical nature
of specific tasks. Although it is probably true that in a large government
bureaucracy assets such as knowledge and equipment can be more easily
redeployed, there are disadvantages associated with keeping specific tasks
within a government bureaucracy. For example, specific tasks can be seen
as a deviation from standard operating procedures (Wilson, 1989: 133) or
a disturbance of bureaucratic routines. Managing such tasks could take up
much time or require skills and expertise that are not available. Charging a
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Table 4. Results of Negative Binominal Regression Analysis on the Number of Established Quangos, Per Year, The Netherlands,
1950–93 (N ¼ 43, Time-lag 1 Year)
Explanatory variables Coefficients (z-value)
Base model Rational actor model Bounded rationality model
Time .05 (.74) .01 (.22) .06 (1.01)
Size of government 3.40 (.71) .38  (.10) 2.83 (.77)
Size of government sector 13.88 (1.90) 6.74 (.96) 4.24 (.63)
Left-wing cabinet .31 (.76) .37 (.96)
Economic growth .05 (.74) .01 (.18)
Elections .19 (.33) .48 (.87)
Corporatism .55 (.90) .24 (.43)
Collectiveness .56 (1.09) .37 (.79)
Specific investments 1.25a (2.18) 1.47b (2.58)
Previous decisions .03 (1.26)
Time * corporatism .02 (.44)
Time * collectiveness .08 (1.68)
Time * specificity .02 (.42)
Monitoring 1.83a (1.98)
Constant 37.03 (1.24) 14.02 (.61) 4.33 (.20)
Log Likelihood 133.69 127.59 123.56
Pseudo R2
Alpha
.02
 1.67c
.06
1.18c
.09
.94c
a p < :05; b p < :01; c p < :001.
quango with policy implementation would solve these problems: a quango is
not part of the core government bureaucracy, which allows for the involve-
ment of external experts, in particular members of interest groups or
voluntary organizations, to ensure efficiency of policy implementation. The
interest of private organizations in these tasks will probably be low, therefore
a quasi-autonomous organization is charged with them.
An additional benefit of putting specific tasks at arm’s length is a reduction
in the political risk of being held accountable for ill performance. If the
bureaucracy is indeed less well equipped to carry out a certain task, the
risk of ill performance increases and also the risk that politicians will be
held accountable. Charging a quango with the task reduces that risk.
It might even be argued that politicians deliberately put the implementation
of highly specific policies at arm’s length when these policies are considered
controversial (see Torenvlied, 2000). In case of ill performance, the quango
will be held accountable.
In sum, the rational actor model does not provide much more explanation
for quango proliferation than the base model did. The increase in the number
of quangos cannot be attributed to particular political parties or to economic
conditions. The tasks of quangos did not appear decisive either to the
decision to establish a quango, nor were characteristics of policy sectors
such as corporatism. Electoral competition was even found to lead to
fewer quangos instead of the expected increase in their number.
Bounded Rationality Model
Politicians are inclined to repeat their decision to establish quangos. If more
decisions in favor of quangos were taken in the previous year, politicians are
more likely to decide to charge a quango with policy implementation in the
present year. The repetition of decisions confirms Hypothesis 7. The diversity
trend is contrary to the one expected, however. Apparently, the number of
quangos charged with the provision of collective goods has decreased,
instead of increased. The diversity of quangos has, therefore, increased,
albeit in the opposite direction of the one predicted.
Finally, Hypothesis 8 is refuted. An increase in the number of decisions
to establish quangos is met with an increase in the degree of monitoring.
Apparently, politicians do not refrain from establishing quangos if monitor-
ing costs will have to be made. The analysis further shows that politicians
impose requirements on quangos more often if the task in question is charged
more frequently to quangos. Earlier, it was assumed that politicians would
want to minimize monitoring costs. By imposing (the same) requirements
in the same instances, the average monitoring costs will decrease. For
example, requirements are imposed more often on quangos with specific
tasks (unless these tasks resemble the provision of collective goods). An extra
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argument to explain the presence of high monitoring demands in the case of
specific tasks could be that politicians fear the possible consequences of the
information asymmetry. Because the expertise and knowledge about a
policy and its implementation is concentrated in a quango (sunk costs),
politicians depend on that quango for information on its performance. The
recent re-assertion of political authority (see below) seems to indicate that
politicians have become aware of this potential dependency.
The publication of reports on the increase in the number of quangos and,
more particularly, the lack of democratic accountability by these bodies (see
Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995 for The Netherlands and Hall and Weir, 1996
for the United Kingdom) have led to several measures to repair the lack of
justification. Examples of this re-assertion of political control (see Rhodes,
1997) are the white papers on Modernizing Government and Joined-up
Government in the UK, the development of guidelines and a law proposal
on ZBOs in The Netherlands and the increase in the use of regulators and
performance assessment in general in most OECD countries (see Power,
1997; Van Thiel and Leeuw, 2002).
Comparison of the Three Models
The bounded rationality model gives the best fit of all models. Moreover, the
theoretical model provides a better prediction of the decisions of politicians
to charge a quango with policy implementation than the number of quangos
established as a result of those decisions. Quango proliferation is caused by
an increase in the size of the government and the repetition by politicians of
their choice for a quango as an executive agent. The explanatory power of
this model still leaves room for improvement, though (pseudo R2 does not
exceed .31).
Conclusions
This article investigates the motives of politicians to use quangos increasingly
for the execution of public tasks. It shows that political and economic con-
ditions are not decisive and, to a lesser degree, neither are the tasks in ques-
tion. Overall, quango proliferation turns out to be a trend. Politicians imitate
previous decisions. This could imply that they are not certain about the
effects of their choice for quangos.
What information do politicians have about the use of quangos? The infor-
mation on the performance of quangos is growing but remains mixed and
contradictory (Naschold, 1996; Boyne, 1998; Ter Bogt, 1999; Pollitt, 2001;
Van Thiel, 2001). The establishment of quangos is, in itself, no guarantee
that the efficiency or quality of policy implementation will improve, as
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assumed in practitioner theory. Nevertheless, politicians still continue to
establish contract agencies, public bodies and use privatization and competi-
tive tendering (see Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). Perhaps there are other benefits
for politicians associated with quango proliferation. Two advantages have
already been identified: blame avoidance and patronage. Moreover, the
incremental expansion of the number of a certain type of agent creates legiti-
macy (Tolbert and Zucker, 1982: 30). Gradually, the choice for that type of
agent becomes more common and accepted by voters. In the end, it will
become the most legitimate type of executive and politicians will choose
that agent merely to please the voters. Their choices are no longer based
on efficiency arguments but have become symbolic choices (Rowan and
Meyer, 1977: 361).
To understand how this imitation works better, the model as presented in
this article needs to be expanded and elaborated further. There are at least
four new research questions one can pose.
First, why would politicians imitate each other? Theories on innovation
diffusion (Rogers, 1995), policy transfer (Bennett, 1991; Dolowitz and
Marsh, 1996), and isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell and
DiMaggio, 1991) present interesting explanations. For example, supra-
national organizations such as the World Bank or the European Union
may force states to adopt certain models of government such as contract
agencies (see Pollitt et al., 2001) and competitive tendering (Van Thiel, 2004).
Second, which actors play which role in imitation? In the model described
here, only politicians are discussed but other actors such as civil servants will
undoubtedly play an important role as well. Dunleavy’s (1991) theory of
bureau-shaping could be used to explain the interest civil servants may
have in the hiving off of departmental units and the establishment of quangos
(see also Christensen, 1999).
Third, how far does imitation go? Basically, the ‘story’ on the spread of
quangos – or NPM in general – is that governments faced with global
economic pressures charge organizations at arm’s length with the execution
of policy tasks, because such organizations are believed to be more efficient
than government itself. While some authors believe this trend is irreversible
and inescapable (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), others argue that western
states have responded in different ways to fiscal pressure and the public’s
dissatisfaction with governments. NPM techniques have been implemented
following different trajectories and adapted to the existing institutional con-
text (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). Rather than straightforward imitation,
countries have emulated, adjusted and hybridized the quango concept. So,
convergence in the adoption of NPM talk is evident (see OECD, 2001) but
variations between and within countries do exist in implementation, types
and results (Pollitt, 2001). Such differences are determined by, for example,
the political system of countries.
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Finally, what are the consequences of the increased use of quangos? Most
debated so far is the potential democratic deficit (see Kettl, 1997: 457;
Skelcher, 1998). Politicians have begun to become aware of the effects of
increased use of quangos. They have responded by taking a number of
measures to re-assert their political authority (see earlier). But there are
other consequences as well quango performance, in particular, that are in
need of further study.
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